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Abstract 
The aim of this paper is to exploit grain price data to detect the warning signs of looming food 
crises in Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger. Firstly we identify which markets play a leading role 
at the national and regional level. The second step consists of identifying crisis periods and 
characterizing price movements during the period preceding a crisis. This analysis leads to the 
identification  of  early  warning  indicators  whose  relevance  is  tested  using  panel  data 
qualitative choice models. The results show that monitoring price movements on “leading 
markets” during crucial periods of the year can help in forecasting future crises. 
Key words: Food security – Africa – Niger – early warning systems – discrete choice panel 
model 
Code JEL: Q18, C25, D40, O18  
Introduction 
Countries located in the Sahel region of Africa are repeatedly confronted by episodes of rapid 
increase in grain prices resulting in food crises, sometimes acute, as in Niger in 2005. This 
crisis highlighted the weaknesses of the early warning system which failed to anticipate the 
crisis, and under-estimated its extent. In Niger, as in the other countries of the Sahel region, 
the food crisis prevention systems remain primarily oriented towards the detection of food 
production  deficits.  In  these  countries,  food  insecurity  is  above  all  the  consequence  of 
insufficient  food  production,  which  results  from  adverse  weather  conditions.  As  a 
consequence, the present early warning systems focus on monitoring the conditions of food 
crops and estimating food availability. 
Information on the state of food availability, summarized in the Cereal Balance Sheet, is, in 
some countries such as Niger, complemented by vulnerability analyses for the populations 
exposed to food insecurity. These analyses aim at evaluating the households’ ability to ensure 
access to food, identifying the populations at risk, and targeting the interventions. In these 
analyses, food price information is considered as an indicator of the ability of the households 
to ensure access to markets to compensate for food deficit. 
The information provided by market prices could also be used to forecast the state of future 
food supply. Indeed, if markets are efficient, prices at any given time fully reflect all available 
information, not only on the current food availability but also on agents’ expectations about 
future scarcity (Ravallion 1985, Deaton and Laroque 1992). In other words, price changes are 
driven by the arrival of new information in the market, and any new information on future 
market conditions is immediately reflected in prices. Thus, it is expected that prices reflect the 
available information on the future harvest very early in the crop season, even  as early as 
during the period of crop maturation. 
The aim of this paper is to show that the information provided by market prices can usefully 
complement  existing  early  warning  systems  which  tend  to  privilege  biophysical  models. 
Using market price data we build indicators to alert policymakers to when a future shortage 
can be expected. In other words, we exploit the statistical properties of grain price data series 
to detect the warning signs of a looming crisis. 
The analysis focuses on three countries – Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso – and a local crop – 
millet – which plays an essential part in the diets of Sahelian populations. Price data come 
from the national Systèmes d’Information sur les Marchés (SIM) of each country. The paper 
is organized in the following manner. Section one presents the data set. Section two is devoted 
to identifying the markets that play a leading role in influencing price at the national and 
regional  levels.  Section  three  presents  an  analysis  of  millet  price  dynamics  aimed  at 
identifying the price crises during the sample period, and characterizing the price behavior   2 
during  the  period  preceding  a  crisis.  This  analysis  leads  to  the  identification  of  warning 
indicators detailed in the fourth section. The relevance of these indicators is tested in the fifth 
section of the paper. These indicators are based on the difference between the current price 
and its long run value measured at the beginning of the harvest season. The final section 
presents conclusions. 
1. The sample markets 
Millet is a non-tradable cereal i.e. a good for which there is no international market but which 
is the subject of intensive cross-border trade in West Africa. Our analysis covers the markets 
of  three  countries  Mali,  Niger,  and  Burkina  Faso,  which  belong  to  the  same  regional 
integration  area  (ECOWAS),  and  to  a  common  monetary  union  (UEMOA).  These  three 
countries  also  share  a  harmonized  system  for  collecting  market  price  information  on 
agricultural products: the SIMs. 
In each country a market information system (SIM) was started in the early 90s. SIMs collect 
market prices for major agricultural products (inc. livestock) and disseminate this information 
to producers, consumers and traders through the media. SIMs have now accumulated a large 
amount of information and can trace the evolution of food prices in a wide geographical area 
and for a wide range of commodities. 
We selected a sample of 50 millet markets from the markets covered by the SIMs: l5 markets 
in Niger, 12 in Burkina Faso, and 17 in Mali. Market selection was based primarily on the 
quality  of  available  information:  markets  for  which  too  much  data  is  missing  were  not 
selected.  Also  markets  were  selected  according  to  their  importance  in  terms  of  trade, 
production, consumption, and to their location (e.g. vulnerable area, border proximity, etc) to 
capture the diversity of situations. The observation period starts in January 1990 in Niger, 
January 1992 in Burkina Faso and February 1993 in Mali.
1 
Millet prices are characterized by large seasonal fluctuations especially in Niger, due to the 
seasonal pattern of the production cycle. Millet prices are lowest during the harvest and post-
harvest period (October to February). Then they gradually rise to reach their maximum level 
at the end of the lean season (May to August in Niger; June to October in Mali and Burkina 
Faso) which precedes the new harvest and during which farmers’ stocks are depleted. 
2. The leading markets 
We consider a leading market to be a market whose past prices significantly contribute to 
influencing current prices in other domestic and/or regional markets. These “leading markets” 
are identified using Granger causality tests on a vector autoregressive (VAR) model estimated 
at the national or regional level. 
The VAR model and the Granger causality test 
The  main  advantage  of  the  VAR  model  is  to  take  into  account  the  fact  that  prices  are 
determined  simultaneously  on  a  set  of  markets,  as  well  as  the  dynamic  nature  of  price 
adjustments. Each price is considered as endogenous and is expressed as a function of the 
lagged values of all of the endogenous variables in the system. The estimated model is given 
by: 
                                                 
1 Five markets in northern Nigeria and one market in northern Benin, covered by the SIM of Niger, are also part 
of  the  sample.  Unfortunately  the  observation  period  is  quite  short  for  these  markets  (2000-2008),  so  these 
markets  cannot  be  incorporated  in  most  of  the  following  econometric  analysis,  despite  their  importance  in 
regional trade.   3 
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Pt is a k vector of prices, Xt is a d vector of exogenous variables, Ai and D are matrices of 
coefficients to be estimated and xt is a vector of innovations that may be contemporaneously 
correlated but are uncorrelated with their own lagged values and uncorrelated with all of the 
right-hand side variables.  
E(xt) = 0 ; E(xtxt’) = S S S S (an m ´ m positive semi definite matrix) ; E(xt xt’’) = 0 for all t ¹ t’. 
t = 1, …, T. T = 201 for Burkina Faso, T = 226 for Niger and T = 187 for Mali. 
The lag order p is selected using the Schwarz information criterion. Prices are deflated by the 
domestic consumer price index (base 2000 = 100).  
The system is estimated using OLS and then Granger causality tests are computed to evidence 
the interdependencies between markets. 
The Granger causality test indicates whether there is a statistically significant relationship 
between current prices on market i and lagged prices on market j. It does not by itself indicate 
causality,  but  identifies  precedence  between  two  variables  and  measures  the  information 
content of lagged variables. The purpose of this analysis is thus to identify markets whose 
prices can help in forecasting future prices in other markets. 
These tests allow us to distinguish four categories of markets: 
-  Leading markets – these markets Granger cause a large number of other markets, but are 
themselves Granger caused by only a few markets. Lagged prices in leading markets play a 
significant role in influencing current prices in other markets and can help to predict the latter. 
In addition, prices in leading markets are weakly exogenous – they do not depend on the 
lagged prices of the other markets in the sample. 
-  Markets that are isolated from trade or information flows - these are markets for which 
prices do not Granger cause those of other markets (or only a small number) and are not 
Granger caused by prices of other markets in the sample (or only a small number). 
-  Markets that are integrated at the regional or national level, linked by  grain trade  and 
information flows to other markets in the sample - prices in these markets Granger cause a 
large  number  of  prices  in  domestic  and/or  foreign  markets  and  are  themselves  Granger 
caused by the prices of many other markets. 
-  Between  these  last  two  types  of  markets,  can  be  distinguished  a  fourth  category,  with 
blurred contours, of "poorly integrated" markets - prices in these markets Granger cause only 
a few other prices and are Granger caused by the price of a small number of other markets. 
Results 
The Granger causality tests are first performed using a VAR model specific to each country, 
incorporating all the selected markets of the country in question. This approach allows us to 
identify the leading markets in each country. In a second step, causality tests are performed on 
a regional VAR model limited to 25 markets of the sub-region.
2, 3 
The analyses conducted at the country level lead to consider as leading markets: Gaya and 
Maradi in Niger; Dori, Tenkodogo and Banfora in Burkina Faso, Nara and Koulikoro in Mali. 
These results are not surprising for Maradi and Gaya, which being close to the borders with 
Nigeria and Benin respectively, are two main gateways for grain imports. In Mali, Koulikoro 
                                                 
2  Including  all  the  domestic  markets  in  the  regional  sample  was  not  feasible  due  to  computer  processing 
limitation.  
3 The regional sample includes:  8 markets in Niger, 7 in Burkina Faso, and 10 in Mali.   4 
is an important wholesale market located in the same region as Nara. In Burkina Faso, Dori is 
an important wholesale market for millet in the Sahel region and is close to the border with 
Niger. Banfora is located at the intersection of major roads, close to the borders of both Mali 
and  Ivory  Coast,  and  is  also  close  to  Bobo  Dioulasso  the  second  city  in  Burkina  Faso. 
Tenkodogo is located in a major production area. 
In contrast some markets appear isolated or poorly integrated. In Niger, the markets of Diffa, 
Goudoumaria and N'Guimi (Region of Diffa), Dosso and Dogondoutchi (Region of Dosso) 
and Gouré (Region of Zinder) can be classified as isolated. In Burkina Faso, Tougan and Fada 
N'Gourma are poorly integrated. This is also the case in Mali for Fana (Koulikoro Region), 
Dioro  (Segou  Region)  and  Nioro  (Kayes  Region).  Some  of  these  markets  are  located  in 
regions classified by the World Food Program as highly vulnerable to food risks (Diffa). 
Others are located in production areas (Tougan, Fada N'Gourma, Dioro) and were expected to 
be more integrated to other markets. These results may be due to high transaction costs and 
low effective demand in poor regions. 
Table 1. Market integration: summary 
  Leader  Isolated  Poorly integrated  Integrated 
Niger  Gaya, Maradi  N’Guimi  Goudoumaria, Dosso, 
Dogondoutchi, Katako, Gouré, 
Filingue, Tahoua 
Agadez, Tillaberi 
Burkina  Dori, Tenkodogo, Banfora  Tougan, 
Fada 
  Djibo, Koudougou, 
Banfora 
Mali  Koulikoro, Nara    Kayes, Nioro  Bankass, Mopti, 
Djenne, Sirakrola 
In bold, the leading regional markets (identified from the regional VAR model). 
At the regional level, the analysis confirms the leading role of Maradi: prices in this market 
Granger cause those of a large number of markets in Niger, Burkina Faso and Mali. The 
leading role of Maradi probably reflects the influence of Nigeria on millet prices within the 
whole sub region. Gaya, which is also a border market close to Benin, has no well-defined 
regional role. 
The markets of Dori and Tenkodogo also confirm their leadership at the regional level, while 
Nara (Mali) which appeared to be a leading market at the national level does not play a 
significant role at the regional level. Banfora (Burkina Faso) also, cannot be considered as a 
regional leader, but is well integrated with other regional markets. 
In summary, the causality tests highlight the important role of a small number of markets at 
the national and regional level, namely: Maradi, Dori and Tenkodogo and to a lesser extent, 
Gaya, Nara and Koulikoro. Priority should be given to the monitoring of these markets whose 
lagged prices can help predicting the prices of other markets, in the framework of an early 
warning system. 
3. Price crisis characteristics  
The approach consists of firstly identifying price crises, and then characterizing the price 
behavior during periods that precede crises. 
Identifying price crises 
The stationarity tests (ADF and KPSS) reject the presence of a unit root and lead to consider 
all the price series as trend stationary. 
The price trend is derived from equation (2). The seasonal dummies, Ms, catch the monthly 
price  fluctuations  related  to  the  production  cycle  and  the  trend,  T,  captures  long  term 
movements related, for example, to population growth:   5 
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The  trend  equation  (1)  is  estimated  for  each  market  price  over  the  whole  period.  The 
coefficient’s stability is tested using the Quandt-Andrews breakpoint test
4 for 158 possible 
breakpoint dates in the period 1990-2008 in Niger, 131 for Mali and 139 for Burkina Faso
5. 
The tests fail to reject the null hypothesis of no structural breaks. 
Figure 1. Millet prices in the capitals of the three countries (Fcfa/kg) 
 
Gray: crises common to the three countries 
Source: SIMs and authors' calculations 
According  to  our  definition  of  crisis,  Niger,  Mali  and  Burkina  Faso  experienced  three 
common crises during this period - 1998, 2002 and 2005 (Figure 1). In addition to these 
shared major crises the three countries were affected by crises of smaller magnitude, limited 
to one or two countries - 1997 in Niger, 1996 in Mali and Burkina Faso, 2001 in Niger and 
Burkina Faso, 2003 in Mali. Most of these crises resulted from a drop in production, but the 
correlation  between  price  and  supply  shocks  is  fairly  weak.  In  2008,  a  few  episodes  of 
transitory crises were recorded, limited to a small number of millet markets in Niger and 
Burkina Faso. These crises were of lesser importance, and 2008 cannot be considered as a 
crisis year in the millet markets. 
Origination and ending dates of crises  
A deeper analysis shows that crises break out during the lean period and are preceded by a 
period of high prices that can be regarded as an alert phase. This phenomenon is most obvious 
in Niger - crises erupt in April, and end in September. They are preceded by a period during 
which prices are above their trend value. This period runs from September/October to March. 
Thus, for example in Maradi, millet prices were above their trend value from September 1996 
                                                 
4 Test for one or more unknown structural breakpoints in the sample. 
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to March 1997, while the crisis broke out in April 1998 (Figure 2). At Gaya, prices were 
above their trend value from September 1996 to January 1997, and the crisis broke out in 
January 1997. 
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In Mali, crises occur later in the year, during May/June and end in October/November. This 
lag follows the harvest calendar that starts later in Mali. These crises are preceded by a period 
of high prices running from October to May. Thus, for example, the 1996 crisis that broke out 
in May/June on the 17 markets of the sample was preceded by a period running from October 
1995 to April 1996 during which prices in almost all the markets were above their trend value 
(see  Figure  3  as  an  illustration).  The  1999  crisis  was  preceded  in  all  markets,  except 
Koulikoro, by a phase of high prices that began in December 1998. The 2002 crisis, the most 
severe, was preceded by particularly high prices starting in September 2001. In contrast, the 
2002 crisis started very early in the year, in October or November for most markets. 
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In Burkina Faso, as in Mali, crises occur, generally in May or June and are preceded by 
positive shocks, but of lower magnitude, from November or December. For instance, the 1996 
crisis was preceded by  a period of high prices starting from November 1995 in Banfora, 
Koudougou, Tenkodogo and Tougan, and from January 1996 in Dori, February in Sankaryare. 
In short, over the period studied, crises break out at the beginning of the lean season and reach 
their climax at the end of the lean season. They are usually preceded by a warning phase, 
characterized by prices higher than normal during the harvest period.   7 
4. Early warning indicators 
The  above  observations  lead  to  the  proposition  of  warning  indicators  based  on  the  gap 
between prices and their trend value during the harvest and post-harvest period running from 
October  to  March.  Different  indicators  are  proposed  and  their  relevance  is  tested  using 
nonlinear panel models. 
Definition 
These indicators aim at capturing as soon as possible the price movements heralding a crisis. 
Special attention is paid to the markets previously identified as leading markets. Three types 
of indicators are proposed being designed to capture the intensity and the spatial extent of the 
shocks during the alert phase. 
First, for each leading market (l), we define a binary warning indicator (IAlr) equal to 1 if the 
market registers a positive shock during the month r, and equal to 0 otherwise. r = 1 to 6, 
represents the six months of the harvest period running from October to March. 
IAlr = 1 if  0 ˆ > - = lr lr lr P P I  ; = 0 otherwise                          (4) 
Ilr is the price shock on the leading market l during month r 
Second,  vigilance  should  increase  with  the  magnitude  of  the  price  disequilibrium  that  is 
captured by an indicator of the intensity of the alert: 
I lr lr I II s / =                                                (5) 
This indicator is calculated for each leading market and each month (r) of the alert period 
(October to March). 
Third, the alert should go up if many markets are simultaneously in a crisis situation. An 
indicator of the spatial extent of the alert is given by the number of markets on alert during the 
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Predictive power of early warning indicators 
The predictive value of the early warning indicators defined above is tested econometrically 
using three types of nonlinear panel models: a probit model, a count data model and a Tobit 
model
6. Each model allows for time specific random effects.
7 The sample set consists of the 
three countries and 19 years of time series observations (1990 – 2008). 
1. The first model (probit) seeks to explain the likelihood of a price crisis in country n at year 
t. The outcome, ynt, is a binary variable that takes 1 if the country is in crisis at year t, and 0 
otherwise. We consider that the country n is in crisis at year t if the mean crisis indicator, E(I), 
calculated on the sample of the m markets of the country during the lean period (s) of year t, is 
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A regression model is formed by parametrizing the probability p to depend on a regressor 
vector of warning indicator (x), a parameter vector b and time-specific effects. 
                                                 
6 See Cameron and Trivedi (2005) and Wooldridge (2001) for a review of these models. 
7 A qualitative response model with fixed effects is confronted by the incidental parameters problem. In a fixed 
effects  model  the  specific  effects  may  be  correlated  with  the  regressors,  generally  leading  to  inconsistent 
estimation of all parameters (Lancaster, 2000).   8 
Table 2. Probit model. Dependent variable = 1 if the country is in crisis; = 0 otherwise 
  (1)   (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9)  (10)  (11) 






































                   
Gaya November 
(Niger) 
  2.965 
(1.678)
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Dori November 
(Mali) 
    3.606 
(1.780)
** 
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November            0.168 
(0.101)
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December              0.261 
(0.112)
** 
       
January                0.265 
(0.106)
*** 
     
February                  0.322 
(0.119)
*** 









































                       
Log-likelihood  - 17.476  -19.446  - 17.677  - 18.439  - 18.479  - 19.340  - 17.474  - 17.505  - 15.382  - 12.885  - 15.954 


































































Nb of observations  51  51  48  48  45  49  49  52  52  52  51 
Significance level: * 10%, ** 5%,*** 1%. Standard errors are in parenthesis; p-value are in brackets. Iaml : intensity of the alert on the leading markets. 
Approximation method of the log-likelihood: adaptive Gauss-Hermite quadrature (Naylor – Smith, 1982).   9 
2. The second estimated model is a count data model that seeks to explain the extent of the 
crisis. The dependent variable, ynt, is a count of the number of markets across country n which 
experienced at least one episode of crisis during the lean season of the year t. ynt, takes on 
non-negative integer values, including zero: {0, 1, 2, …}. 
3. The third model to be estimated is a limited dependent variable model (standard censored 
Tobit) that seeks to explain the intensity of the crisis ynt Î [0 ; +¥[ . The censored regression 
Tobit model expresses the observed response, ynt, in terms of an underlying latent variable. 
The independent variables in the probit, Tobit and count models are the warning indicators 
defined above - a binary warning indicator for each leading market (IAlr), an indicator of the 
alert intensity for each leading market (IIlr), and the number of markets on alert (IEnr). These 
three types of indicator are calculated monthly for the harvest and post-harvest period from 
October to March. 
The test strategy consists in introducing successively the monthly warning indicators into the 
regressions,  starting  with  the  earliest  indicator  (October)  and  ending  with  the  last  one 
(March). The testing procedure stops when the indicator enters significantly in the regression. 
This procedure allows both for testing the adequacy of warning indicators, and identifying 
those which detect a looming crisis earliest. 
The estimation results for the probit model are given in Table 2; Table 3 gives the marginal 
effects of the exogenous variables. The share of the specific component (r) is quite high and 
significant,  which  means  that  the  panel  estimation  is  more  relevant  than  the  pooling 
estimation (see the likelihood ratio test). 
The warning indicator for the leading market Maradi is significant from November (Table 2, 
column 1), and its marginal effect on the probability of crisis is 56% (Table 3). According to 
these results, if the millet price in Maradi is above its trend value during November, the 
likelihood of a widespread crisis arising six to seven months later is 56%. The probability of 
crisis also increases by, respectively, 33%, 50% and 34%, if the markets of Gaya, Dori, and 
Tenkodogo (three leading markets) are on alert in November. However, an alert at Nara may 
not be considered as a significant harbinger of a crisis until December. 










December  Market on alert (IAls) 
0.558  0.326  0.500  0.340  0.498 
November  December  January  February  March  Number of markets on alert 
(IEns)  0.067  0.104  0.106  0.128  0.172 
November          Alert intensity at Maradi (IIls) 
0.736         
Source: the authors. 
Therefore, the marginal effect of an alert in Maradi during the month of November is high, 
both in absolute terms, and relative to the marginal effect of an alert in any other of the 
leading markets considered. These results confirm the importance of monitoring the price 
movements in Maradi. 
The  variable  "number  of  markets  on  alert"  is  also  significant  from  November  (Table  2, 
columns 6-10). The marginal effect of the number of markets on alert in November on the 
probability  of  crisis  is  7%,  and  this  effect  increases  over  time  -  it  increases  to  10%  in 
December, 11% in January, 13% in February, and 17% in March. 
The alert intensity, which is measured as the price deviation from its trend value relative to its 
standard deviation, appears to be a good indicator of the occurrence of a crisis. This indicator   10 
is more relevant than the scope of the alert, which is caught by the number of markets on 
alert. Indeed, the marginal effect of the alert intensity at Maradi on the probability of crisis is 
as high as 74% for the month of November (Table 3). In other words, the higher the price 
increases in Maradi at the beginning of the season, the greater the likelihood of a widespread 
crisis. 
In the count data model, the incidence rate ratio (IRR) is given by e
b . It measures the variation 
in the dependant variable for a one unit change in the independent variable, xnt, with all other 
variables in the model held constant. 
The results from this model (Table 4) confirm the previous ones. The warning indicator for 
Maradi significantly explains, from November onwards, the extent of the crisis to come. The 
same applies for Dori’s warning indicator from December onwards. Specifically, the IRR 
shows that when Maradi  (Dori) goes on alert in November (December) the predicted number 
of markets in crisis increases by a factor of 6.725 (Equations 1 and 3, Table 4). We note that 
an alert in Gaya or Tenkodogo in November or December does not significantly predict the 
extent of the crisis (Equations 2 and 4, Table 4). 
The number of markets on alert (Equations 5-9, Table 4) enters significantly in the Poisson 
regression model, but its ability to predict the extent of the crisis is fairly low, with an IRR 
close to one in November. However the IRR for the number of markets on alert in March is 
slightly higher - the expected number of markets in crisis increases by 17% when one more 
market is on alert during March. 
The intensity of the alert on the leading markets, especially Maradi, is only significant from 
February, and cannot be considered as a good predictor of the extent of the crisis (equations 
10-13, Table 4). In other words, the number of markets affected by the crisis is not directly 
related to the magnitude of price increases in Maradi at the beginning of the season. 
The  results  from  the  Tobit  model  (Table  4)  corroborate  the  previous  ones  -  the  warning 
indicator for Maradi in November is positively related to the intensity of the coming crisis. 
The  same  applies  for  the  Gaya  warning  indicator  in  November,  as  well  as  Dori  and 
Tenkodogo  in  December.  The  marginal  effects
8  show  that  when  Maradi  goes  on  alert  in 
November, the crisis intensity rises by 2.8. The marginal effect of Dori’s warning indicator 
(November) and Tenkodogo (December) is of the same order of magnitude, it is lower for 
Gaya (November) (Equations 14-17, Table 4). 
As in the probit model case, the marginal effect of the number of markets on alert increases 
with time (Equations 18 to 22, Table 4). Finally, the intensity of the alert at Maradi at the 
beginning of the season (November) significantly explains the intensity of the future crises. 
However, the marginal effect of this variable on the intensity of the crisis is not higher than 
the effect of the binary warning indicator. 
In summary, the results show that the three types of warning indicators identified above, are 
relevant as they significantly explain the scope and the intensity of future crises. Our analysis 
shows that it is of most importance to monitor millet price movements in Maradi during the 
harvest period. Indeed, the probability of a widespread crisis breaking out five or six months 
later sharply increases when prices in Maradi are above their trend value in November. The 
results  also  show  that  monitoring  all  markets  during  the  harvest  period  does  not  add 
significant extra information. However, it may be useful to monitor the markets of Gaya, Nara 
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unit change in an independent variable x affects censored observation (y).   11 
and Tenkogogo as well as Maradi. If these markets are also on alert during the last months of 
the year, the probability of crisis increases significantly. 
5. Conclusion 
Whatever the explanatory factors of the price crisis, our analysis shows that it is possible to 
anticipate crises from the observation of past price movements. The crises that erupt usually 
during April or May, may in fact be anticipated as early as November by monitoring the price 
movements in some key markets – most importantly Maradi, but also Dori, and to a lesser 
extent Gaya and Tenkodogo.  
The warning indicators defined in this paper should usefully complement the early warning 
systems currently focused on crop monitoring. They have the advantage of being based on 
objective  information,  easy  to  collect,  and  rapid  to  collate.  These  indicators  could  be 
calculated in each country and integrated into the national warning system. However, the high 
correlation  of  crises  should  encourage  the  construction  of  a  regional  warning  system, 
incorporating  indicators  from  all  the  three  countries.  Irregularities  detected  early,  at  the 
beginning of the harvest, on the border markets of Nigeria and Benin must lead to alerts for 
not  only  the  authorities  of  Niger,  but  also  of  Burkina  Faso  and  Mali,  about  the  possible 
occurrence of a crisis. 
Of course, our calculations face a number of limitations. The main one is the quality of the 
estimated  price  trend  value.  We  used  a  very  simple  form  for  the  trend  equation.  The 
advantage of this specification is ease of calculation and updating of indicators. In return, the 
goodness of fit is sometimes poor. The introduction of the consumer prices index instead of 
the trend variable generally improves the accuracy of the estimates. However the consumer 
prices index is published with a delay of several months, so a warning system based on this 
index would be ineffective. 
With hindsight, the adequacy of the warning indicators, based on the deviation of prices from 
their trend value seems to be satisfactory. However it is difficult to assess the ability of these 
indicators to prevent  crises in advance. Simulations were made for the period 2000-2008 
which were satisfactory. They show, however, the need to periodically update the price trend. 
In  that  regard,  we  suggest  a  “conservative”  approach  that  consists  in  updating  the  trend 
estimates only if the predicted trend values are lower than previous forecasts. This method, 
which tends to underestimate the trend value, is expected to lead to better detection of coming 
crises, although at the cost of an increase in the number of false alarms.  
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Table 4. Estimation results for the count data model and the censored data Tobit model 
   Count data model (Poisson)  Censored data model (Tobit)   
Dependent variable  Number of markets that have experienced at least one episode of 
crisis during the lean season  Crisis intensity   
Independent variables  b  IRR  d  LR (d=0)  Log-V  Eq.  b  marginal 
effect 
















2.812  1.822 
(0.505) 
0.719 














1.792  2.135 
(0.580) 
0.781 
















2.792  1.922 
(0.553) 
0.739 







































3.151  1.932 
(0.551) 
0.739 
(.126)  - 50.45  (17)  48 













0.117  2.131 
(0.566) 
0.806 
(0.098)  - 54.47  (18)  49 













0.170  1.975 
(0.513) 
0.815 
(0.095)  - 52.06  (19)  49 













0.192  2.061 
(0.528) 
0.848 
(0.081)  - 51.43  (20)  52 













0.214  1.831 
(0.462) 
0.847 









































0.253  1.460 
(0.369) 
0.789 
(0.106)  - 44.49  (22)  52 











3.096  1.885 
(0.980) 
0.676 
(0.140)  - 52.05  (23)  51 











2.906  1.732 
(0.486) 
0.706 
(0.132)  - 53.03  (24)  51 











2.812  1.485 
(0.435) 
0.640 






























3.169  1.448 
(0.419) 
0.626 
(0.154)  - 51.10  (26)  52 
Significance level: * 10%, ** 5%,*** 1%. Standard errors are in parenthesis; p-value are in brackets. IRR : Incidence rate ratio. 
The constant value is not reproduced. Approximation of the log-likelihood by adaptive Gauss-Hermite quadrature (Naylor – Smith, 1982) 